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Introduction
The United States Supreme Court and other federal 
and state courts have consistently dismissed challenges 
against open space requirements and reductions in 
minimum lot sizes similar to those that exist within 
ordinances regulating conservation subdivisions. 
Although some precedent exists for finding open space 
requirements and minimum lot sizes unconstitutional, 
courts have only reached such conclusions in limited 
situations where the challenged regulations destroy the 
entire economic value of a plaintiff’s property, where 
there is no rational basis for the regulations, or where 
the land use regulation is found to substantially interfere 
with the property owner’s use and enjoyment of their 
property.  
General Grant of Deference to Local 
Governments for Land Use Issues
Courts have provided significant deference to local 
governments in zoning matters, recognizing that 
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent 
values incident to property could not be diminished 
without paying for every such change in the general 
law.”  Consequently, municipalities may control 
residential growth to promote the public good under 
their police powers as long as those powers are not being 
used in a discriminatory manner.  With these concerns 
  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 60 U.S. 393, 43 (9).  
  See e.g. Eastampton Center L.L.C. v. City of Eastampton, 
155 F.Supp.2d 102, 119 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that land use 
in mind, courts have limited the types of government 
actions that constitute a taking and have refused to find 
unconstitutional takings solely based on a decrease in an 
individual’s property value.3  
Zoning Regulations and the Takings 
Clause 
Open Space Requirements
Developers and property owners frequently attempt to 
challenge local open space requirements by alleging 
that the prohibition of development on private property 
constitutes either a regulatory taking or an exaction.4 
Developers argue that the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, which states that “private property [shall 
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation,” 
renders open space requirements unconstitutional 
where they fail to compensate land owners for property 
that cannot be developed based on those land use 
regulations.
 
Open space requirements can be viewed in two ways, 
depending on the purpose of the open space requirement. 
If a locality requires an open space requirement for public 
use, courts have engaged in the analysis traditionally used 
for exactions.6  If, however, the open space requirement 
is not put to any public use but rather serves as a mere 
restriction on the property owner’s right to develop their 
property, it is analyzed under the regulatory takings 
jurisprudence that has evolved through the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
ordinance that is restrictive but not discriminatory falls within 
local government’s police power).   
  Steele Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.d 96 
(st Cir. 97).  See also Manor Dev. Corp. v. Conservation 
Comm’n, 433 A.d 999 (980).  
  See e.g. Norman v. U.S., 63 Fed. Cl. 3 (Fed. Cl. 004) 
(assessing open space requirement as regulatory taking); Watt 
v. Planning & Zoning Commission of the Town of Kent , No. 
CV 99008094S,  000 WL 3460 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. , 
000) (assessing open space requirement as an exaction).  
  U.S. Const. amend. V.  The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment 
has subsequently been incorporated to state and local govern-
ments.  Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 66 U.S. 6, 39 
(897).  
  Dolan v. City of Tigard,  U.S. at 386-9 (explaining cur-
rent test for determining whether conditions on development 
constitute exactions requiring just compensation).  
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Council and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of 
New York.7
Open Space Requirements as 
Unconstitutional Conditions/Exactions
Where an open space requirement serves as a basis for 
requiring that the open space be put to public use, the 
Supreme Court, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, established 
a two-part analysis through which to assess the 
constitutionality of the regulation.8  As the first step, the 
court must decide “whether [an] essential nexus exists 
between [a] legitimate state interest and the…condition 
exacted by the city.”9  The Court has recognized such 
things as the prevention of flooding and the reduction 
of traffic congestion as legitimate public purposes for 
which an exaction may be imposed.0
Once an essential nexus has been established, it becomes 
the court’s responsibility to determine whether there is a 
“required degree of connection between the exactions 
and the projected impact of the proposed development.” 
The existence of a reasonable relationship between 
the property’s use and the exaction demanded by the 
local government distinguishes appropriate exercises 
of the police power from unconstitutional takings. 
The Supreme Court has used the term “rough 
proportionality” to describe the reasonable relationship 
required to sustain such exactions.3  To establish the 
rough proportionality between the property’s use and 
  See Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at -87 (analyzing land use pro-
hibition as regulatory taking). 
  C.f. Dolan,  U.S. at 384 (“the conditions imposed were 
not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of 
her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the 
property to the city”).  
  Id. at 386.  
0  Id.  Even though the Supreme Court invalidated the re-
quirement from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S.  (980), 
that any government regulation of private property “substan-
tially advance” a legitimate state interest, the Court explicitly 
stated that it did not overturn the analysis used in Dolan, argu-
ing that the test in that case and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission assessed the specific situation where the govern-
ment attempted to condition an individual’s constitutional right 
to receive just compensation for the taking of their property 
in exchange for “a discretionary benefit that has little or no 
relation to the property.”  Lingle v. Chevron, 44 U.S. 8, 30 
(00).  
  Dolan,  U.S. at 386.    
  Id. at 390.  
  Id. 
the challenged exaction, the Court refuses to require a 
mathematical calculation.  The Court, however, does 
require some type of individualized determination that 
“the required dedication is related both in nature and 
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”4  An 
individualized determination, however, is not necessary 
where the local government can show that an ordinance 
was adopted before the filing of a plat application and 
the ordinance’s requirements are reasonably related to 
the projected impact of a proposed development. 
Numerous state courts have applied Dolan to open space 
requirements enacted by cities since the holding in Dolan 
was reached by the Court in 994.6  State courts are 
deferential to local governments in determining whether 
there is an “essential nexus” between the exaction 
demanded and a legitimate state interest.  However, 
when assessing whether the exaction is not excessive in 
light of the impact of a proposed development, courts 
are less deferential and will require local governments to 
establish that their open space requirement is “roughly 
proportional” to the projected impact.   
In Connecticut, for example, a superior court has noted 
that the test for determining whether a local government 
may condition the development of a subdivision on 
the set aside of open space for public use as parks and 
playgrounds is  “whether the burden cast upon the 
[subdivision developer] is specifically and uniquely 
attributable to his own activity.” 7  
Applying this test in Watt v. Planning & Zoning 
Commission of the Town of Kent, the court upheld 
Kent’s open space requirement under Part I of the Dolan 
analysis, noting that the burden imposed upon the 
developer is “uniquely attributable” to the development 
of the subdivision because the subdivision would cause 
a population increase, necessitating more open space.8  
  Id.  The Supreme Court struck down the zoning ordinance 
in question in Dolan as applied to the property in question be-
cause the city failed to show a reasonable relationship between 
its exaction of a floodplain easement and a proposed building 
under the second part of the Court’s analysis.  Id. at 39.  
  Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 877 P.d 87 (994).  
  See e.g. Watt, 000 WL 3460; Hartman v. The Twp. of 
the City of Readington, No. 0-07(SRC), 006 WL 333 
(D.N.J. Aug. , 006). 
  Watt, 000 WL 3460, at *8.   
  Id.  Courts in other states have found the maintenance of 
open space and the preservation of the historical character of 
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The courts’ more stringent analysis of the “rough 
proportionality” of an exaction in the second part of the 
Dolan inquiry is exemplified by Isla Verde International 
Holdings v. City of Camas.  In Isla Verde the Camas 
Planning Commission sought to impose a thirty percent 
set aside for open space based on its power under the 
Camas Municipal Code.9  Because the Camas Municipal 
Code defined open space as “areas set aside and suitable 
for active or passive recreation,” the Washington Court 
of Appeals evaluated the plaintiff’s takings challenge 
under the exactions inquiry laid out in Dolan.0  
In assessing the takings claim, the court decided to 
use the Dolan two-part exactions analysis despite 
arguments that no physical taking had occurred because 
title had never been transferred away from the property 
owner.  The court dismissed this argument, noting 
that “alienation of title is not a necessary predicate to 
a taking; the essence of the harm is the government’s 
unconstitutional interference with one’s right to use and 
enjoy property.”  Because the city ordinance required 
a set-aside of land for wildlife preservation, which the 
court considered a “public benefit,” the court viewed 
the ordinance as an exaction that interfered with the 
plaintiffs’ fundamental right to improve their property. 
Having decided to analyze the ordinance as an exaction, 
the court applied the Dolan inquiry.  Part I of the Dolan 
test was easily satisfied because the court found that 
there was an essential nexus between the open space 
requirement and the proposed subdivision’s destruction 
of thirteen acres of preexisting open space.  The court, 
however, determined that the city’s evidentiary showing 
was insufficient to establish “rough proportionality” 
between the thirty percent set aside and plaintiff’s 
proposed 3 lot development.3  Specifically, the court 
noted the absence of studies or formulas establishing 
a community to satisfy the “essential nexus” required by the 
Court in Dolan.  See e.g. Hartman v. The Township of Read-
ington, 2006 WL 2353223 (finding essential nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements met for ordinance imposing open 
space requirement on new residential developments).  
  990 P.d 49, 43 (Wash. Ct. App. 999).  
0  Id. at 43 n. (citing Camas, Wash., Code § 8.6.00(B) 
(999)).  
  Id. at 43.  
  Id. at 436.  
  Id. at 436-37.  
why a thirty percent set aside was necessary for the 
construction of the subdivision.4  Because the city failed 
to meet its minimal required showing that its exaction 
was proportional to the impact of the development, the 
court determined that the thirty percent set aside violated 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Washington Court of Appeals’ assessment of the 
Camas Open Space Ordinance under the Dolan exactions 
analysis rather than under the Penn Central regulatory 
takings analysis has been explained on a number of 
grounds.  The appellate court itself explained that the 
language from City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes 
relied upon by the City of Camas, which limited the Dolan 
exactions analysis to situations where the government 
had actually taken a portion of private property for a 
public use, was merely non-binding dicta.6  Further, the 
court noted that notwithstanding the language from Del 
Monte Dunes, the open space requirement in the present 
case was an exaction because the property owner was 
required to turn over possession of the property to “a 
permanent protective mechanism acceptable to the 
City.”7  Therefore, the city’s requirement in this case 
that the open space be turned over to a neighborhood 
homeowners’ association led the court to determine that 
the open space requirement was an exaction that required 
just compensation.8  In addition to the city ordinance’s 
requirement that landowners turn over the open space to a 
protective mechanism, the ordinance had other language 
that suggested that a primary purpose of the open space 
requirement was public use of the property.  Specifically, 
the ordinance required that the open space be suitable for 
“active or passive recreation”9 and provided that half of 
  Id.
  Id. at 437.  
  Id. at 436 n.3.  
  Id.  See also CMC § 8.6.00(B) (specifying separate 
tracts, protective easements, and dedication to public agencies 
or private land trusts as protective mechanisms that would be 
acceptable to city). 
  Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, 990 P.d at 436 n. 3.  The Wash-
ington Court of Appeals, in a departure from most accepted 
case law on the topic, determined that any set-aside which 
required the preservation of land by turning it over to a private 
homeowners’ association constituted a dedication of the land 
for public use.  Telephone Interview with W. Dale Kamerrer, 
Senior Partner, Law, Lyman, Daniel, Kamerrer & Bogdanov-
ich, P.S., in Olympia, Wash. (Sep. 4, 007). 
  Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, 990 P.d at 43 n.  (citing CMC 
§ 8.6.00(B)).  
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the open space on a given property could be credited 
towards the city’s “Open Space Network.”30
Other literature has looked to other considerations in 
assessing the Washington Court of Appeals’ decision to 
classify the Camas Open Space ordinance as an exaction. 
Some have argued that the ordinance was found to be an 
unconstitutional exaction because it provided the city’s 
zoning board with significant permitting authority, vesting 
in it “a large amount of discretion and the [consequent] 
opportunity to abuse that discretion.”3  Still others 
have sided with the Washington Court of Appeals by 
noting that Del Monte Dune’s discussion of when to use 
exactions was merely a statement of historical fact that 
the Court had not previously applied the Dolan exactions 
inquiry to cases involving permit denials rather than a 
pronouncement that the Dolan inquiry could never be 
used in the future to assess such permit denials absent 
some form of dedication, easement, or conveyance of 
land to the government.3
While courts will frequently require local planning and 
zoning commissions to engage in individual inquiries 
when imposing open space requirements exacting 
property as conditions of particular developments, courts 
have afforded a higher level of deference when the open 
space requirements are created as part of generally-
applicable ordinances.
One case in which courts assessed a facial challenge to 
an open space requirement was Dunham v. Planning 
Commission of the Town of New Milford.  In Dunham the 
town of New Milford sought to impose a fifteen percent 
open space requirement for public use. 33  The plaintiff, a 
0  C.f. id. at 43 n.  (citing CMC § 8.6.00(C)) (acknowl-
edging that, at times, open space could be developed for “ac-
tive recreation”).  
  Jane C. Needleman, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When 
Nollan and Dolan Should Be Triggered, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 
63, 78-79 (006); see also id. at 8 (noting that Wash-
ington Court of Appeals addressed “head-on” potential for City 
of Camas to abuse its power in permitting context).  
  John J. Delaney, Applicability of Nollan-Dolan Rough 
Proportionality Requirements to Non-Possessory Exactions 
and Exactions Imposed by Legislative Enactment, in ALI-ABA 
Course of Study 000, at 639, 647 (ALI-ABA Land Use Insti-
tute Aug. 9, 000), available at http://law.wustl.edu/landuse-
law/delaneyI.html.  
  Dunham v. Planning Comm’n of the Town of New Milford, 
No. CV000838, 00 WL 34, at *7 (Conn. Super. 
property owner in New Milford, contended that the city 
had imposed a taking because it had not engaged in an 
individual determination of whether the fifteen percent 
open space requirement bore a sufficient relationship to 
the impact of the proposed subdivision.34
In its analysis of the plaintiff’s claim, the court 
concluded that legislatively imposed open space 
requirements were distinct from adjudicatively imposed 
open space requirements because they did not require 
the individualized determinations referenced in 
Dolan.3  Rather, where entire open space requirement 
ordinances were challenged on their face, they enjoyed 
“a presumption of constitutionality” because the burden 
rested with the party challenging the regulation.36
Open Space Requirements as Regulatory 
Takings
Even though open space requirements are frequently 
analyzed as exactions, open space requirements placed 
on conservation subdivisions, or “cluster developments,” 
would likely not be considered exactions subject to the 
analysis used in Dolan or Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission.  Whereas open space requirements that 
are classified as exactions often require public use 
of the open space, in conservation subdivisions the 
principal alleged harm of an open space requirement is 
that the property owner is denied the ability to develop 
a certain portion of their property.  Accordingly, “the 
rule applied in Dolan…[is] not designed to address, 
and is not readily applicable to…questions arising 
where…the landowner’s challenge is based not on 
excessive exactions but on denial of development.”37 
Therefore, considerations of “rough proportionality” 
Ct. Aug 0, 00).  The open space requirement was viewed as 
an exaction of property for public use based on accompanying 
regulatory language that required “open space to have direct 
access to a public street.”  Dunham at * (citing New Milford, 
Conn., Rev. Ordinances § .9.)
  Id.
  Id. at *8.  
  Dolan,  U.S. at 39 n.8.   See also Hardy Farm Ltd. 
P’ship v. Southbury Planning Comm’n, No. CV990363908, 
2001 WL 548919 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 2001) (finding that 
city acted within its police power in amending zoning ordi-
nance to increase open space requirement from ten percent to 
fifteen percent).  
  City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 6 U.S. 687, 703 
(999).  
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and whether there is a “substantial nexus” between the 
proposed development and the open space requirement 
are not applicable to an analysis of whether an open 
space requirement within a conservation subdivision 
constitutes a regulatory taking.38
In situations where individuals allege that a government 
regulation has interfered with their ability to make 
productive economic use of their property, courts have 
classified the government action as a traditional taking, 
requiring an analysis entirely distinct from the Dolan 
exactions inquiry, which assesses the physical taking of 
property as a condition for a government benefit.39  Once 
the court has established that a physical taking has not 
occurred, the court then assesses whether a government’s 
regulation constitutes a regulatory taking.  Under the 
Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, the 
first question asked is “whether a particular claimed 
taking [is] ‘categorical’ or not.”40  A property owner can 
demonstrate that the government, through regulation, 
has caused a ‘categorical taking’ if the regulation has 
denied the property owner “all economically beneficial 
or productive use of [their] land.”4  If no categorical 
taking is found, the court must analyze whether there 
has been a regulatory taking through the three-part 
balancing test established by the Supreme Court in Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.4
Even though there is limited case law on whether 
conservation subdivision open space requirements 
violate the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, other cases 
have considered instances in which the government has 
placed restrictions on the use of an individual’s property 
in much the same way that a city or county would restrict 
the use of a portion of a property owners’ property under 
a conservation subdivision open space requirement.  In 
Norman v. United States, for example, a property owner 
wanted to develop commercial and industrial office 
  Id.
  See e.g. Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 43 (“The longstanding 
distinction between acquisitions of property for public use and 
regulations prohibiting private use makes it inappropriate to 
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents 
for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory 
taking.”).  
0  Rith Energy, Inc. v. U.S., 47 F.3d 3, 36 (Fed. Cir. 
00).  
  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 0 U.S. 003, 0 (99). 
  438 U.S. 04 (978). 
space on a ,4 acre parcel of land.43  Development 
of the property was conditioned upon submitting the 
development plans to the Army Corps of Engineers to 
grant a Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act.44 
Under the permit ultimately issued by the Army Corps 
of Engineers, the property owners were required to 
preserve 0.8 acres of the property as wetlands with 
a deed of restrictions that “prohibited all development 
on the wetlands areas…and required that the wetlands 
area be maintained as open space.”4  The plaintiffs 
challenged the permitting requirements, arguing that 
the condition that they maintain the wetlands acreage as 
open space constituted a taking of their property without 
just compensation.46 
In its assessment of how to analyze the plaintiffs’ takings 
claim, the Court of Federal Claims first determined 
that a requirement to preserve a portion of property 
for conservation did not constitute a physical taking. 
Noting that a physical taking of property required an 
“exclusive and permanent occupation by the government 
that destroys the owner’s right to possession, use and 
disposal of the property,”47 the court determined that no 
physical taking had occurred in the present case because 
the government did not occupy or physically possess 
the property.48  Rather, the court determined that the 
plaintiffs alleged “a classic regulatory taking.”49
Restricting a portion of a parcel of land from development 
also does not constitute a categorical taking, which 
only occurs in “the extraordinary circumstance when 
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is 
permitted.”0  Because courts look at the entire parcel of 
land owned by the property owner, anything short of a 
100% open space requirement would not be classified 
as a categorical taking.  Therefore, any open space 
requirement imposed for conservation purposes would 
be analyzed under the specific factors set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Penn Central.  The Court of Federal 
  63 Fed. Cl. at 34.  
  Id.
  Id. at 40.  
  Id. at 33-34.  
  Id. at 46.  
  Id. at 48.  
  Id. 
0  Lucas, 0 U.S. at 07.  
  Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 349 (Fed. Cir. 00).  
  Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional 
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Claims reached this conclusion in Norman, where it 
determined that the required set aside for wetlands 
preservation only decreased the amount of property 
available for usage by 0%.3
Under the Penn Central analysis for regulatory takings, 
courts look to three factors when deciding whether a 
government action requires just compensation: “() 
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with 
the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed 
expectations; () the economic impact of the regulation 
on the claimant; and (3) the character of the governmental 
action at issue.”4 
The “reasonable investment-backed expectations” 
segment of the analysis questions whether the land use 
restriction was in place prior to the plaintiff’s acquisition 
of the property, based on the principal that “[o]ne who 
buys with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of 
economic loss.”  If an open space requirement was 
passed after individuals had already purchased the 
affected property, this factor would weigh in favor of 
finding a regulatory taking.  
In the second part of the analysis, assessing the 
“economic impact of the regulation,” a court generally 
looks to the change in the fair market value of the 
property caused by the challenged regulation.6  What 
constitutes a sufficiently severe economic impact 
to justify compensation has been a topic of debate 
among courts.  While it is clear that there will be no 
compensation in cases like Norman, where the court 
found that the open space requirement actually increased 
the value of the property, how much of a diminution in 
property is necessary to establish a regulatory taking is 
subject to the discretion of the individual court.  Courts 
Planning Agency, 3 U.S. 30, 330 (00).  
  Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 6.  
  Id. at 6 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 4).  
  Creppel v. U.S., 4 F.3d 67, 63 (Fed. Cir. 994).  Even 
though the regulatory status of property upon acquisition is 
highly persuasive in determining investment-backed expecta-
tions, it is not decisive.  Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 33 U.S. 
606 (00).  
  Walcek v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. at 8.  See also U.S. v. Cart-
wright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (defining fair market value as 
“the price at which the property would change hands between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller…both having reasonable 
knowledge of the relevant facts.”).  
have frequently found an insufficient diminution in the 
value of property to justify a taking even where the 
property suffered a decrease in value of close to 0%.7 
Notwithstanding the wide discretion afforded to courts, 
they generally require a showing of a “serious financial 
loss” to establish the basis for a taking.8  Accordingly, 
even though a determination of the economic impact 
would be highly fact-specific, unless a developer suffers 
a serious financial loss from an open space requirement, 
it is unlikely that this factor would weigh in favor of 
finding a regulatory taking. 
The final factor considered under Penn Central is the 
“character of the government action” that causes the 
diminution in the value of the plaintiff’s property.  Here, 
the court is required to balance “the liberty interest of 
the private property owner against the government’s 
need to protect the public interest through imposition 
of a restraint.”9  Finally, even when the government 
purpose is legitimate, courts must determine whether 
the government action is unfair to the plaintiff because it 
places the burden of remedying a larger societal problem 
disproportionately on the plaintiff’s shoulders.60  
It is likely that courts would find that the character of the 
government action imposing an open space requirement 
on conservation subdivisions supports a finding that there 
has not been a taking.  Federal courts have previously 
found that societal concerns for ecological preservation 
supersede plaintiffs’ interest in having the liberty to use 
their property as they wish.  In Norman, for example, the 
court determined that the preservation of wetlands was 
a “legitimate public welfare obligation.”6  Similarly, 
in Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed District, the 
Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that a land use 
  See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension 
Trust, 08 U.S. 60, 64 (993) (Supreme Court found that 
46% diminution of value did not constitute regulatory taking); 
Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. U.S., 7 Fed. Cl. , , 9 (003) 
(finding 49.6% decrease in value did not constitute “severe 
economic impact”).  
  Cienega Gardens v. U.S., 33 F.3d 39, 340 (Fed. Cir. 
003).  
  Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 70. 
0  Chenega Gardens, 33 F.3d at 340.  
  Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 8.  The court in Norman specifi-
cally stated that the preservation of wetlands was a necessary 
government function because of the role that wetlands play in 
“water purification and water quality enhancement…and ero-
sion and sedimentation control functions.”  Id.  
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ordinance prohibiting development of the lower level of 
a floodplain was justified in light of the public interests 
it was intended to serve.6  Additionally, if an open space 
requirement is applied uniformly to all areas designated 
as conservation subdivisions, courts would be unlikely 
to find that the governmental action disproportionately 
imposes a burden on any single plaintiff.63
Even though any judicial assessment of the 
constitutionality of an open space requirement that 
does not provide just compensation will be very fact-
specific, under the Penn Central factors, most open 
space ordinances are not likely to be classified as 
unconstitutional takings.  Even though an argument can 
be made that a property owner’s investment-backed 
expectations support finding a taking where a land use 
ordinance is enacted after their purchase of the property, 
because an open space requirement’s economic impact 
would likely not be substantial and because an open 
space requirement serves valid government purposes 
and generally does not impose a disproportionate burden 
on any single plaintiff, when taken as a whole the Penn 
Central factors weigh against finding a regulatory 
taking.  
Minimum Lot Size Ordinances
As with minimum open space requirements, courts 
are hesitant to get involved in local zoning and land 
use disputes involving minimum lot size ordinances 
lest they assume the role of a “super zoning board.”64 
Despite this hesitancy, however, courts are willing to 
award compensation in those circumstances where a 
minimum lot requirement either completely deprives 
property of its economic value 6 or is supported by all 
three elements of the Penn Central analysis.66
City of Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale provides an 
example of the deference that courts provide to local 
  See Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed Dist., 83 N.W.d 
538, 543 (Minn. 1979) (adding that “floodplain and wetlands 
regulations…have generally been held not to constitute takings 
of private property”). 
  See Id. at 287 (finding no disproportionate burden where 
plaintiff was treated by Army Corps in fair and even-handed 
manner).  
  Id. at 933 (citing Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306, 
308 (8th Cir. 996)).  
  Lucas, 0 U.S. at 030-3.    
  Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 4.  
governments in crafting land use planning ordinances.67 
In that case, Sunnyvale, Texas enacted a minimum lot 
size requirement of one acre for all residences.68  A 
major landowner in the city sought to create a residential 
development with a density of three units per acre.69 
Ultimately, the property owner sued the town when 
the Zoning Commission rejected his application for the 
development.70  
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas found the 
city’s explanation for its denial, a desire to preserve 
the overall character of the community and to protect 
it from the effects of urbanization, to be a legitimate 
state interest.  Similarly, the court found that a minimum 
lot size did not totally destroy the economic value 
of the property.7  The court noted that, even after the 
minimum lot size ordinance, the value of the property 
was still $.4 million.7  Finally, the court found that the 
minimum lot-size ordinance did not interfere with the 
plaintiff’s reasonable investment-backed expectations 
because the town had maintained the same one acre 
minimum lot size requirement for twelve years prior to 
the plaintiff’s proposal to build 3,600 units on its ,00 
acres of property.  Accordingly, the court concluded, any 
expectation of building such a development could not 
have been “reasonable.”73
Similarly, in LaSalle National Bank v. City of Highland 
Park a plaintiff purchased two lots in Highland Park, 
Illinois.74  Subsequently, the city reduced the permitted 
minimum lot size of the property from 40,000 square 
feet to ,000 square feet and granted permits for 
the development of two subdivisions. 7  Before the 
plaintiff’s subdivision was approved, however, the city 
increased the minimum lot size to 0,000 square feet. 
The plaintiff sued alleging that the action constituted a 
  Mayhew v. Town of Sunnydale,  S.W.d  (Tex. 
).
  Id. at .
 Id. at .
0  Id.
  Id. at 938.  
  Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 0 
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding that regulatory taking based on 
elimination of all property value only occurs where the prop-
erty is left “economically idle”).  
  Mayhew, 964 S.W.d at 937-38.  
   N.E.d  (Ill. App. 00).
  Id. at 78-86.  
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taking without just compensation.76  
The Illinois Court of Appeals quickly identified a 
legitimate government interest, noting “a sufficient 
nexus…between reducing density and…prevent[ing 
the] construction of lots of substandard size.”77  Further, 
because the minimum lot size at the time of the 
plaintiff’s purchase of the property was 40,000 square 
feet, the court determined that the subsequent effective 
decrease of the minimum lot size to 0,000 square 
feet did not interfere with the plaintiff’s investment-
backed expectations.78  Finally, the court determined 
that the increase of the minimum lot-size from ,000 
to 0,000 square feet merely diminished the value of the 
plaintiff’s property but did not completely destroy its 
economic value, suggesting a minimal economic impact 
under the Penn Central analysis.79  Accordingly, the 
court concluded that the fact that the minimum lot size 
ordinance deprived the property of its most profitable 
use was an insufficient basis for finding that a regulatory 
taking had occurred.80
Even where it appears that a city has altered its land use 
regulations in a way that significantly impacts a property 
owner’s investment-backed expectations, some case 
law suggests that the judicial presumption in favor of 
local zoning regulations will lead courts to require very 
significant harm to those expectations before they are 
willing to find a regulatory taking.  
This presumption was seen in Marshall v. Board of 
County Commissioners, where the United States District 
Court for the District of Wyoming found that a plaintiff’s 
investment-backed expectations were not sufficiently 
diminished to establish a regulatory taking where the 
county imposed a five acre minimum lot requirement 
when the plaintiff sought a permit to develop a 
subdivision.8  Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s claims 
that the county undermined his investment-backed 
expectations by reducing the number of lots he could 
place on the subdivision from twenty-three to seven, 
  Id.
  Id. at 797.  
  Id. (noting that plaintiffs had “plaintiffs had full knowledge 
of the land use regulation when they purchased the property”). 
  Id. at 798 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 3).  
0  Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 90, 9 (96). 
  Marshall v. Board of County Commissioners, 9 F.Supp. 
46, 49-60 (D. Wyo. 996).  
the Court, applying the factors from Penn Central, 
determined that no regulatory taking had occurred 
because there had not been a “complete destruction 
of [the] plaintiff’s investment backed expectations.”8 
Accordingly, absent a complete diminution of the 
plaintiff’s reasonable investment backed expectations, 
the court was unwilling to find a regulatory taking. 
Marshall evidences courts’ general hesitancy to construe 
minimum lot size requirements as regulatory takings 
when applying the factors from Penn Central.  
Regulatory Takings Under the Georgia 
Constitution
Like the United States Constitution, the Constitution 
of the State of Georgia provides a basis for just 
compensation when the government takes private 
property.83  When assessing whether the government has 
affected a regulatory taking, the Georgia Supreme Court 
has determined “that a zoning classification may only 
be justified if it bears a substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morality or general welfare.  Lacking such 
justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or 
unreasonable.”84  Accordingly, “if the zoning regulation 
results in relatively little gain or benefit to the public 
while inflicting serious injury or loss on the owner, 
such regulation is confiscatory and void.”8  In Guhl 
v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp., the Supreme Court 
of Georgia adopted six specific factors to use when 
conducting a regulatory takings analysis.  
() existing uses and zoning of nearby 
property; () the extent to which property 
values are diminished by the particular 
zoning restrictions; (3) the extent to which the 
destruction of property values of the plaintiffs 
promotes the health, safety, morals or general 
welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain 
to the public, as compared to the hardship 
imposed upon the individual property owner; 
() the suitability of the subject property for the 
zoned purposes; and (6) the length of time the 
property has been vacant as zoned considered 
in the context of land development in the area 
  Id. at 474 (emphasis added).  
  Ga. Const. art. I, § III, ¶   (“private property shall not be 
taken or damaged for public purposes without just and ad-
equate compensation being first paid”).  
  Barrett v. Hamby, 3t Ga. 6 (Ga. 97).  
  Id.
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in the vicinity of the property.”86
Georgia courts have placed the burden on the plaintiff 
to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a 
zoning ordinance creates a significant detriment for a 
landowner and is simultaneously unrelated to the public 
health, safety, morality, and welfare.87  Absent this 
showing, a zoning ordinance’s presumption of validity 
will prevail.88
Under the balancing test that the Georgia Supreme Court 
established in Barrett v. Hamby and elaborated on in Guhl, 
the government has consistently upheld regulations that 
impose a prohibition on the development of a portion 
of an individual’s property.89  The court imposed a high 
standard for finding a substantial burden on the plaintiff 
to justify compensation, noting that “[m]any regulations 
restrict the use of property, diminish its value or cut 
off certain property rights, but no compensation for 
the property owner is required.”90  Alternatively, the 
Supreme Court of Georgia has construed the public 
interest liberally, noting that “the concept of public 
welfare is broad and inclusive” incorporating values that 
are spiritual, physical, aesthetic, and monetary.9
The court’s narrow construction of private burdens and 
broad construction of public interest suggest that it would 
not find land use restrictions in conservation subdivisions 
to be regulatory takings.  The court has reached this 
holding previously for regulations that similarly 
restricted the use of portions of private property.  For 
example, in Pope v. City of Atlanta, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia upheld standards imposed by the Atlanta 
Regional Commission pursuant to the Metropolitan 
River Protection Act that limited the impervious cover 
in a fifty-year floodplain to 20%.9  A property owner 
within the floodplain challenged the impervious surface 
standard as an unconstitutional taking.  The court, 
  Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp., 38 Ga. 3, 33-4 
(Ga. 994) (quoting LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Cnty. of Cook, 08 
N.E.d 430 (Ill. 96)).  
  Gradous v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Richmond Cnty, 6 Ga. 469 
(986).  
  Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. Cty. of Atlanta, 64 Ga. 764 (Ga. 
994). 
  See e.g. Parking Ass’n of Ga., 64 Ga. at 76; Pope v. Cty. 
of Atlanta, 4 Ga. 33, 33 (Ga. 978).  
0  Pope, 4 Ga. at 334. 
  Parking Ass’n, 64 Ga. at 766. 
  Pope, 4 Ga. at 33-33.  
noting the State of Georgia’s constitutional authority to 
restrict land use for the protection of natural resources 
and the environment, concluded that the impervious 
surface coverage limitation related to the public health 
and safety because it prevented surface water run-off 
and soil erosion.93  Because the plaintiff’s property 
value was only partially diminished and the impervious 
surface limit served an important public interest, the 
court found that the City of Atlanta was acting within 
its police power and, therefore, had not affected a 
regulatory taking.94  The court’s holding in Pope might 
be even more persuasive in the context of an open space 
requirement within a conservation subdivision, as there 
would likely be no decrease in the property value of a 
development due to the fact that that the number of lots 
on the property would not decrease.9
Similarly, in Parking Association of Georgia v. City of 
Atlanta, the City of Atlanta imposed an ordinance that 
required parking lots to have landscaped areas equal to 
at least ten percent of the paved area of the parking lot.96 
The Parking Association of Georgia filed suit alleging 
that the ordinance was an unconstitutional taking.97  After 
determining that such a regulation required assessment 
under the court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,98 the 
Supreme Court of Georgia found that the ordinance 
was not an unconstitutional taking merely because it 
deprived the plaintiff of its most profitable economic use 
of the property when the ordinance furthered the valid 
public interest of beautifying the city.99  Accordingly, 
the Supreme Court of Georgia would likely also 
determine that the state constitution’s prohibition on 
uncompensated takings does not require compensation 
for individuals impacted by open space or minimum lot 
size requirements within conservation subdivisions.
  Id. at 33.  
  Id. 
  C.f. Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 7 (noting that wetlands 
mitigation set-aside had effect of increasing value of plaintiff’s 
property).  
  Parking Ass’n of Ga., 64 Ga. at 764.  
  Id.
  Id. (“The zoning ordinance does not authorize a permanent 
physical taking or occupation of plaintiffs’ property by another; 
it merely regulates the use of plaintiff’s’ property.”)
  Id. at 76-66.  
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Zoning and the Equal Protection 
Clause
In addition to challenging open space requirements under 
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, developers 
and property owners have sought to challenge zoning 
regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.00  In such claims, plaintiffs allege 
that because an open space requirement is not imposed 
uniformly upon an entire jurisdiction, but rather is distinct 
to specified zones within a city or county or to specified 
developments, the local government does not afford all 
of its citizens equal protection under the law.0  
Courts have been hesitant to find equal protection 
violations based on land use ordinances and, accordingly, 
have required very specific showings to establish 
violations of the Equal Protection Clause.0  Courts have 
acknowledged that in the area of land use planning it is 
frequently impossible to provide any definite reason for 
why one zone has particular land use specifications while 
another zone does not.03  Therefore, because “[l]and use 
regulations typically do not implicate any protected class 
or fundamental right,”04 zoning authorities must only 
provide a rational basis for their land use decisions.  
Although a “rational basis” does not require a significant 
showing on the part of a local government, the local 
government must be able to offer at least some justification 
for its land use decisions to show that its actions are 
not arbitrary.  Accordingly, where land use restrictions 
such as open space or minimum lot size requirements 
cannot be found to bear some relationship to the public 
00  See e.g., Board of Sup’rs of James Cty. Cnty. v. Rowe, 6 
S.E.d 99, 06-07 (Va. 97) (plaintiff alleged Equal Protec-
tion Clause violation based on different zoning classifications 
on adjacent properties).  
0  See id. at 03-04 (discussing plaintiff’s claim that varia-
tion in open space requirements with adjoining property denied 
them equal protection under the law).  
0  See id. at 06 (requiring evidence of discrimination 
against the plaintiff to overcome presumption of validity car-
ried by zoning regulations in adjacent areas).  
0  Id. (quoting W. Bros. Brick Co. v. Cty. of Alexandria, 9 
S.E.2d 881, 886 (1937) (“It is seldom that there is any definite 
reason for holding that a lot on one side of a line should be 
devoted to one purpose and that just across it to anther.”) 
0  LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Cty. of Highland Park, 799 N.E.d 
78, 798 (Ill. Ct. App. 003).  
health, safety or welfare, they may be struck down under 
the Equal Protection Clause.0  However, even where 
there is no legislative history or express findings, so 
long as there would be a legitimate state interest under 
any conceivable circumstance, a zoning ordinance will 
be upheld.06  Therefore, for a plaintiff to prevail on an 
Equal Protection Clause challenge, they must establish 
that they have been treated differently than similarly 
situated persons and that the local government has no 
conceivable rational basis for the disparate treatment.07
Based on the highly deferential equal protection analysis 
that almost always upholds a challenged land use 
ordinance, courts have struck down equal protection 
challenges to minimum lot size requirements based 
on finding either a lack of disparate treatment or the 
presence of a rational basis for the disparate treatment. 
For example, in Mayhew, the plaintiffs alleged an 
Equal Protection Clause violation where the town 
of Sunnyvale, Texas rejected their application for a 
development with a density three times that permitted 
by the minimum lot size ordinance.08  The plaintiffs 
claimed that other developments with higher densities 
had previously been approved by the same zoning 
commission.09  The Supreme Court of Texas determined 
that the Equal Protection claim failed because the 
plaintiff was not similarly situated to those other parties 
whose developments had been approved by the city. 
Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff’s proposed 
00 acre development would have a much greater 
impact on the community than other landowners who 
sought to construct buildings on much smaller parcels of 
land.0  By contrast, in LaSalle National Bank, plaintiffs 
0  Rowe, 216 S.E.2d at 211 (finding landowners overcame 
legislative presumption to invalidate twenty-nine percent open 
space requirement because requirement would have left no 
space for parking at commercial buildings and requirement 
was not justified by local government under any of its police 
powers).  
0  Central States, Southeast, & Southwest Areas Pension 
Fund v. Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 8 F.3d 799, 806 (7th 
Cir. 999).  See also Marshall, 9 F.Supp. at 474 (noting that 
state does not have to articulate actual objective of regulation 
as long as court can conceive of facts that justify state-imposed 
classification).  
0  Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 8 U.S. 6, 64 
(000).  
0  Mayhew, 964 S.W.d at 96.  
0  Id. at 939.  
0  Id. 
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alleged Equal Protection violations when their proposal 
to develop two homes was denied because it violated the 
city’s minimum lot size requirements even though other 
proposals that violated the minimum lot size ordinance 
had already been approved.  In assessing the claim, 
the court determined that the City of Highland Park’s 
concern for protecting the character of the neighborhood 
from the use proposed by the plaintiff in that particular 
instance served as a sufficiently rational basis for 
rejecting the plaintiff’s use variance notwithstanding the 
fact that similar use variances had already been approved 
by the city.
While it is not impossible for a developer to press 
a claim alleging a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause, courts’ deference to local governments’ exercise 
of their land use and zoning powers under the rational 
basis standard suggests that only in the most egregious 
circumstances will a court strike down an open space or 
a minimum lot size requirement based on the disparate 
treatment of similarly situated individuals. 
Conclusion 
A developer who seeks to challenge an open space 
requirement or a minimum lot size ordinance as either 
an unconstitutional taking or a violation of the United 
States Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection will 
inevitably face an uphill battle.  While a developer might 
succeed in establishing that an open space requirement 
is unconstitutional as an exaction if they can prove that 
the condition on development imposed by the city either 
does not bear a “substantial nexus” to the problem that 
the city seeks to address or is not “roughly proportional” 
to the development’s contribution to that problem, it is 
more likely that a court would consider any open space 
requirement under a regulatory taking analysis.  Under 
this categorization, the developer would have to establish 
that, on balance, the interest pursued by the government is 
not sufficiently important to justify the economic impact 
inflicted upon the property owner or the damage done to 
  LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 799 N.E.d at 798.  
  Id. at 799.  See also Marshall, 9 F.Supp. at 474 (con-
cern for having sufficient number of wells, aquifers, and septic 
systems was legitimate state interest justifying minimum lot 
size and other restrictions on proposed development).  
the property owner’s investment-backed expectations. 
Similarly, if the developer sought to challenge a land use 
regulation under the equal protection clause, they would 
have to overcome the heavy presumption favoring the 
ordinance’s constitutionality by establishing that the 
framers of the land use restriction had a discriminatory 
intent and that the ordinance bore no rational relation 
to any aspect of the local government’s police 
powers.  Accordingly, it is likely, but not certain, that 
constitutional challenges would not prevail against open 
space requirements or minimum lot size ordinances.   
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